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INTRODUCTION: WHY OIL AND GAS 
ARBITRATION DISPUTES ARE SO COMMON 
Out of the 123 cases listed as “pending” under ICSID arbitration 
as of the end of 2007, forty-six (or 37%) were related to energy 
disputes.1  Similarly, a look at the top fifty commercial arbitrations 
as listed by The American Lawyer in June 2007,2 reveals that 
nineteen (or 38%) out of these fifty were related to energy 
arbitration, of which the overwhelming majority relates more 
specifically to oil and gas. There are certainly several motives parties 
may have in bringing oil and gas disputes. These motives may 
include environmental claims, shareholders commercial disputes, 
regulatory conflicts,3 trade restrictions, etc. 
This Article concentrates on two motives that are critical in 
explaining the large incidence of oil and gas cases in treaty and 
commercial arbitration. First, the opportunism arising from large 
crude oil price swings. When crude oil price changes dramatically, 
some parties that are engaged in long-term contracts might have 
strong incentives to renegotiate. When renegotiation is not feasible, 
disputes arise. Second, since oil and gas resources are viewed in 
most countries as strategic, there is always a tendency to use public 
 1. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], List of 
Pending Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Gen 
CaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending. 
 2. Arbitration Scorecard 2007: Top 50 Contracts Disputes, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER, June 13, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 
1181639139062. 
 3. It is common to observe oil and gas arbitration disputes arising as a 
consequence of regulation conflicts, as energy facilities normally involve the 
access to bottleneck facilities such as pipelines and refineries, whose prices in 
some countries are regulated to avoid potential abuses on the exercise of monopoly 
power. 
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policy such that energy prices become a tool for income 
redistribution policies or other national policies that require alteration 
of existing long-term contracts. 
Both motives have in common that they provide a window of 
opportunity to produce large transfers of wealth in a short period of 
time, and this, unsurprisingly, will tend to generate conflicts that end 
up in international arbitration or domestic litigation. 
I. OPPORTUNISM IN TIMES OF CRUDE OIL 
PRICES SWINGS 
Given the inherent risks and costs of exploration as well as 
development of oil and gas fields, these activities are typically 
arranged via long-term contracts. Normally, a government or a state-
owned oil corporation grants a permit, license, or concession4 to 
explore and exploit a basin under some sort of contractual 
arrangement with private parties. Private parties, in turn, will find it 
useful to develop commercial arrangements to share the costs and 
hazards of exploration, as well as the risks related to volatility of 
crude oil prices. 
Long-term contracts, thus, are a useful way to share and diversify 
risks in the sourcing of oil and gas, ex-ante. From an economic 
perspective, contracts promote efficiency since not only do they 
allow for risk sharing, but they also provide for an anticipated 
distribution of rents among involved parties, without the parties 
having to repeatedly bargain over the terms of trade when market 
conditions change.5
 4. A typical license, permit or concession would involve the State (or a state-
owned agency) to grant access to a private party for the exploration and 
exploitation of a block in a particular geographical area, usually for a limited 
number of years. In exchange, the State might require a revenue sharing or profit-
sharing agreement, as well as payments of special taxes and royalties. Revenue-
sharing agreements of the “kind or cash” type are also very common. Some of 
these arrangements might also include so-called “relinquishment clauses,” which 
require private companies to either discover commercially proven reserves in a 
given period of time, or release the block back to the State. In addition, 
arrangements can include pecuniary targets for exploration work or investment 
expenditure targets. See also Alqurashi, Z. 2005. International Oil and Gas 
Arbitration. Special OGEL Study Vol. 3. p.36. 
 5. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The 
Governance of Contractual Relations, in FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND 
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When crude oil market prices trade at levels that are substantially 
above or below what parties might have expected, windows for 
opportunism materialize as one of the parties might have strong 
incentives to reshuffle the rent distribution. In particular, when the 
risks related to the exploration effort have been overcome, such costs 
become sunk and thus the likelihood for renegotiation and 
opportunism increases.6  At this stage, parties might attempt to 
renegotiate or engage in opportunistic behavior (which consequently, 
may bring about arbitration or litigation) given their desire to turn 
around the ex-ante bargain, into a redistribution of rents to their 
favor. The risk of opportunism is exacerbated by the fact that 
governments typically have reserved certain legal prerogatives as it 
relates to the ownership and management of the mineral resources 
and/or as a regulator of the sector.7
If we observe the increase of crude oil prices that started in early 
2003,8  both measured in nominal and real terms, it is not difficult to 
see why so many oil and gas arrangements settled prior to this price 
CONTRACTS: A READER IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 168, 189 (Peter J. Buckley 
& Jonathan Michie eds., 1996) (comparing idiosyncratic transactions with 
efficiency of non-idiosyncratic contracts). 
 6. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: 
An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1, 44-45 (Gary Fromm ed., 
1981) (detailing price dynamics and theories of disequilibrium in the market); 
Alice Hill & Manuel Angel Abdala, Argentina: The Sequencing of Privatization 
and Regulation, in REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: 
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 202, 203 (Brian Levy & Pablo 
T. Spiller eds., 1996) (linking sunk costs and opportunism in the 
telecommunications industry, making that industry, like the energy industry, 
vunerable to expropriation). In oil and gas wells, as well as pipeline networks, 
assets cannot be moved to alternative uses in the same way that a metal stamping 
factory, for instance, could transfer most of its assets away into other types of 
manufacturing. 
 7. See Alqurashi, supra note 4, at 85.  
Besides, petroleum agreements are generally characterized by state intervention in one 
way or another. The state may institute to its own favour exclusive public rights 
relating to the exploitation of petroleum such as state ownership of mineral resources 
or subjection of exploitation of petroleum to authorization by the state. In countries 
where the ownership of petroleum is not vested in the state, the state may nevertheless 
reserve broad regulatory powers as to the exercise of the right to exploit petroleum 
(e.g., regulations by the state regarding prospecting and production). Id. 
 8. Saudi Arabia – The Oil Market Perspective, APS REV. OIL MKT. TRENDS 
(Input Solutions), Sept. 24, 2007 (noting the increase in oil prices by 150 percent 
in US dollars since 2003).
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surge are ending up in renegotiation, mediation, arbitration, and/or 
litigation. Figure I shows that the real price of WTI (West Texas 
Intermediate) crude oil from mid 2003 to the end of 2007 has 
increased from $41.7 in January 2003 to $114.4 in June 2008, back 
to the same level of $41.7 in January 2009, all measured in constant 
dollar value as of January 2009. Such high levels and high volitility 
of prices were not observed in the prior 20 years to 2003.9 Thus, it    
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 9. WTRG Economics, Oil Price History and Analysis (Updating), 
www.wtrg.com/prices.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2008) (analyzing the trends of 
crude oil prices, identifying effects such as the Asian economic crisis and the Yom 
Kippur war). 
 10.  See U.S. Energy Information Administration. Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price 
FOB (Dollars per Barrel), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist_xls/ 
RWTCm.xls (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); Bureau of Labor Statistics, PPI All 
Commodities, available at http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/ servlet/SurveyOutputServlet 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
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should not be surprising that some parties have sought to renegotiate 
or unilaterally (and opportunistically) change contractual conditions 
to their favor.11  In particular, several countries have tried to increase 
 11. See, e.g., Mobil Invs. Can. Inc. v. Canada, Request for Arbitration, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, ¶¶ 45-49 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www. 
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/MobilMurp 
hy.pdf (complaining about newly instituted Guidelines as a breach of contract); 
Noble Energy Inc. v. Ecuador, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/12, ¶¶ 14-15 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ 
Noblev.EcuadorJurisdiction.pdf (claiming breach of contract through the alteration 
of the legal, contractual, economic and regulatory framework); Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, 
¶¶ 2, 40-41 (July 6, 2007), available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/document/Kardassopoulos.pdf (requesting arbitration for policies of the 
new Georgian government as breach of contract); Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/15 (pending) (concerning the arbitration of an oil and gas 
distribution enterprise); Azpetrol Int’l Holdings B.V. v. Azerbaijan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/15 (pending) (relating to the arbitration of an oil and gas distribution, 
trade, storage and transportation enterprise); Chevron Block Twelve v. 
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/10 (pending)  (arbitrating the exploration, 
development and production of natural gas); TG World Petroleum Ltd. v. Niger, 
ICSID Case No. CONC/03/1(settled Apr. 8, 2005); ConocoPhillips Co. v. 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30  (pending); ENI Dación B.V. v. 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/4 (settled Apr. 18, 2008); Mobil Corp. v. 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27 (pending); City Oriente Ltd. v. Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21 (settled); Liman Caspian Oil B.V. v. Kazakhstan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/14 (pending) (awaiting arbitration on the exploration and 
extraction of hydrocarbons); see also Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/1  (pending) (requiring arbitration over gas production and distribution 
and a power generation project); El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, ¶¶ 23-24 (Apr. 27, 2006), available 
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/elpaso-jurisdiction27april2006.pdf (objecting to 
breach of contractual obligations where “the Government began to withdraw 
fundamental rights and safeguards from investors in the energy sector”); Pan 
American Energy L.L.C. v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/13, ¶¶ 20-21 (Jul. 27, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf (summarizing the allegations of 
the complainant of violations of international and Argenitne law); Mobil 
Exploration & Dev. Inc. Suc. Argentina v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/16 
(pending); Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/14  (Dec. 19, 2008); see generally Embassy of Venezuela in the U.S., Fact 
Sheet: Arbitration Between ExxonMobil and Venezuela (Feb. 18, 2008), http:// 
www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3174 (summarizing negotiations between 
Chevron, Statoil, Total S.A., ENI, and Venezuela’s national oil company PDVSA 
over projects in the Orinoco Oil Belt); Davies Arnold Cooper, Venezuela 
Challenges $12 Billion Freezing Order Obtained by ExxonMobil in Support of 
ICSID Proceedings, WIRE: INT’L ARBITRATION, Feb. 25, 2008, at 1, available at 
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their “government take” on crude oil, either by increasing taxation, 
royalties, fees, rights, and duties by altering the pre-existing profit-
sharing or revenue-sharing agreements with the private sector, or by 
requiring private companies to relinquish shareholdings in their 
companies to the State or to a state-owned oil company.12
http://www.dac.co.uk/whatsnew/uploads/ExxonPDVSA(1).pdf (citing ExxonMobil 
and ConocoPhillips as firms that refused to accept terms of PDVSA’s deal); 
Fernanado Cabrera Diaz, Ecuador Threatens Cancellation of Oil Contracts Unless 
ICSID Nixed as Arbitration Forum, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008, at 
6, available at www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/p/21/download.aspx 
(discussing Ecuador’s $70 million settlement with City Oriente in exchange for 
withdrawing its ICSID claim); Damon Vis-Dunbar, Caratube International Oil 
Company LLP v. Republic of Kazakhstan: American Investor Sues Kazakhstan 
Over Oil-Field Dispute, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Sept. 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2008/09/26/caratube-inter 
national-oil-company-llp-v-republic-of-kazakhstan-american-investor-sues-kazakh 
stan-over-oil-field-dispute.aspx (reporting the breaches of fair and equitable 
treatment and expropriation alleged by Liman Caspian Oil); Michael Mortimore & 
Leonardo Stanley, Has Investor Protection Been Rendered Obsolete by the 
Argentine Crisis?, CEPAL REVIEW, Apr. 2006, at 15, 28-31 (cataloging legal 
proceedings brought before ICSID against Argentina).
 12. See Russell Hotten, Western Firms Settle Kazakhstan Oil Dispute, THE 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 15, 2008, at 5 (describing a group of major 
crude oil companies being forced to cede some control of the massive Kashagan 
oil field in Kazakhstan); Geri Smith, Bolivia’s Risky Game, BUSINESS WEEK, May 
3, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/may2006/ 
gb20060503_773605.htm (reporting that some investors in Bolivia pay as little as 
18% in royalties on oil); Sarah Hines, Bolivia Under Evo Morales, 
SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG, Oct. 27, 2006, http://socialistworker.org/2006-
2/607/607_06_Bolivia.shtml (recounting the Bolivian government’s requirement to 
renegotiate contracts with terms more favorable to the government); Marcela 
Valente, Argentina: Extension of Oil Contract Faces Court Challenge, GLOBAL 
INFORMATION NETWORK, Sept. 21, 2007 (quoting vice president of MORENO in 
Argentina, commenting on Bolivia’s insistence on 50% royalties for natural gas); 
Till the Pipes Squeak, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2005 (reporting the increase in the 
corporate income tax rate for oil companies in the North Sea from 40-50% in the 
UK); Gov’t Hikes Oil Royalty, Gujarat, Assam to be Richer by Rs 400 cr, THE 
HINDU BUSINESS LINE, Feb. 5, 2003, http://www.hinduonnet.com/businessline/ 
2003/02/05/stories/2003020502620100.htm (indicating the approval of an increase 
in royalties for the Oil and Natural Gas Company in India); Venezuela’s Chavez 
Squeezes Oil Companies with Taxes, Raids, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 24, 2005, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? pid=nifea&&sid=a3z63_HrIvtc (reporting 
a raise in taxes on companies running oil fields to 50%); Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez 
Targets Major Foreign Oil Companies in Nationalization Fight, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,243901,00.html (elucidating 
the tactics of forcing nationalization and ending talks with big oil companies over 
planned takeovers); Inti Landauro, Colombia Still Attracts Oil Cos Despite Higher 
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II. INTRODUCTION OF PRICE CONTROLS AS A 
REACTION TO HIGH CRUDE OIL PRICES 
Governments that use energy prices such as gasoline, gas oil, fuel 
oil, and natural gas as a tool of price control provide another source 
of current arbitration disputes, especially when such policies are 
against prior commitments and promises of keeping markets 
deregulated. With the post-2003 surge in energy prices, certain 
countries started to use price controls as a mechanism to avoid the 
impact of costly energy prices on customers. Absent compensation, 
these policies of subsidizing customers at the expense of energy 
producers have either created or have the potential to create 
arbitration disputes.13
Taxes, SMARTMONEY.COM, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/ 
news/ON/index.cfm?story=ON-20080925-000884-1613 (pointing out that an 
increase in tax has not dissuaded investors from committing $500 million); Sven 
Ridley-Wordich, Offshore Oil Discoveries in Brazil to End Middle East 
Supremacy?, RESOURCES INVESTOR, Apr. 25, 2008, http://www.resourceinvestor. 
com/pebble.asp?relid= 42274 (speculating that the increase in taxes after 
government review of legislation could potentially increase the special 
participation tax to between 40-60%); Despite Record-Breaking Crude Oil Prices, 
Cost in Peru Remains Stable, LIVING IN PERU, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www.livinginperu.com/news-5886-miningenergy-despite-record-breaking-cr 
ude-oil-prices-cost-peru-remains-stable (discussing the increase in taxes and 
royalties that will occur if the price of crude oil increases). Compare Patricia I. 
Vasquez, Argentina Slaps Export Tax on Oil Firms, OIL DAILY, Jan. 8, 2002 
(describing the implemention of export taxes in addition to already existing royalty 
and earnings taxes) with Argentina Details Export Tax, OIL DAILY, Nov. 20, 2007 
(recording a substantially increased export tax that effectively sets the levy at 121 
percent when oil reaches $93 a barrel, as compared to previous 45%). 
 13. See, e.g., Mortimore & Stanley, supra note 11, at 30 (documenting the 
complaint in Total S.A. v. Argentina because Total S.A. was not allowed to use its 
previously agreed upon mechanism for rate calculation); Pan American Energy 
L.L.C., Decision on Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13  ¶¶ 11, 
21 (detailing the impacts of the Argentine financial crisis and the subsequent 
alleged infringements of Pan American’s rights); El Paso Energy Int’l, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 ¶¶ 10-12 (alleging breaches of 
fundamental promises made by the Argentine government to induce investment 
after the Argentine financial crisis); Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/14; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 93-106 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694
_En&caseId=C8 (arguing about the purpose of a PPI adjustment and justification 
for its alteration due to the economic crisis); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 44 I.L.M. 1205, ¶¶ 68-70 (2005) 
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III. DAMAGE METHODOLOGIES AS APPLIED TO 
OIL AND GAS CASES 
A.USING AN APPROPRIATE DAMAGE METHOD 
Estimating damage compensation in international arbitration 
disputes in the oil and gas industry poses several challenges from the 
perspective of a damage valuation expert. In particular, it is 
important to select a damage method that appropriately accounts for 
uncertainty in the value of future expected revenues.14  Valuing 
future revenues is essential in oil and gas companies since future 
expected profits (and thus value) is fundamentally affected by the 
estimated ability of the company to produce crude oil and gas from 
existing reserves (proven and probable), and sell it at future prices, 
which are quite volatile. Therefore, in the price dimension (and to a 
lesser extent in quantities), there is sizeable uncertainty, and thus 
risk, that must be accounted for. 
Asset-based approaches utilizing either replacement values or 
book values of assets are not likely to be very useful in determining 
damages in oil and gas cases. This is because both methods provide 
an historical account of past investments and thus might not 
(claiming devastating effects to profits and investment due to the government’s 
refusal to adjust the PPI in the aftermath of the Argentine financial crisis); Enron 
Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 63-65, 71-72  (May 22, 
2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf (outlining 
complaints about the suspension on PPI adjustments, and their abolition through an 
emergency law); AES Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 ICSID (W. 
Bank) 308, 309 (2005) (requesting arbitration for the Argentine government’s 
failure to apply previously agreed tariff calculations and adjustment mechanisms); 
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, 46 I.L.M. 40, 48-49 (2007) (stating the direct price intervention 
measures taken by the Argentine government); see also Noble Energy Inc., 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12  ¶ 20 (outlining the 
government intervention that aimed to lower wholesale electricity prices); 
Stephanie Ho, China Caps Energy Prices in Bid to Control Inflation, VOICE OF 
AMERICA NEWS, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-01-10-
voa10.cfm (reporting the recent introduction of energy price freezes on oil 
products, natural gas, and electricity). 
 14. Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Damage Valuation of Indirect 
Expropriation in International Arbitration Cases, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 447, 
455 (2003) (stressing the pitfalls of using transaction prices for damage valuations 
because of the fluctuations in pricing). 
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represent the value that shareholders can extract from future cash 
flows, thus failing to account for the true value (and risks) related to 
the activity. In addition, in emerging countries, accounting 
legislation might not require companies to price their assets in the 
books according to fair market values. Thus, discrepancies between 
market values and book values are likely to be relevant, in particular 
given the high volatility of crude oil prices which directly affects the 
market value of oil and gas companies. 
Market-value approaches such as comparable sale transactions are 
useful as long as the assets are truly comparable. As usual, the 
difficulty with this approach is that it is hard to find an observable set 
of transactions that fit the counterfactual scenario, that is, that reflect 
sales prices in the absence of the damaging actions. 
Income-based approaches, on the other hand, such as the 
Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) and the Adjusted Present Value 
(“APV”) methods are more suitable because they provide a more 
direct way to measure expected revenues (and their corresponding 
cash flows) into the future. This Article will focus on the DCF 
method, putting emphasis on its attributes and use as it relates to oil 
and gas cases. Finally, this Article will include a warning note on the 
use of the APV method, which is yet to be adopted as a standard 
practice in the profession. 
B. KEY CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE DCF METHOD 
The DCF is the most common methodology used in valuation 
analyses.15  First, it is widely supported by the professional literature, 
and its workings are well understood. Indeed, most investors rely on 
a DCF analysis to determine whether or not to undertake a particular 
project.16  Second, the DCF approach is widely accepted by 
 15. William C. Lieblich, Determinations by International Tribunals of the 
Economic Value of Expropriated Enterprises, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 37, 38 (1990) 
(explaining that the DCF method is the most common valuation method because it 
is the only method that can measure the amount of cash estimated to be earned by 
an entity on a day-to-day basis). 
 16. See Carlos Trejo, Real Options: Understanding the Basic Concepts 1 (Sept. 
2000) (unpublished assistantship project, Mississippi State University), available 
at http://www.rstc.msstate.edu/publications/99-01/rstcofr01-042a.pdf (contrasting 
DCF with other methodologies, illustrating its predominance in the valuation 
field). 
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international agencies, such as the World Bank, as a valid method to 
estimate damages and fair market valuations in international 
disputes.17  Indeed, in many energy cases panels have adopted the 
DCF method without hesitation.18
Several surveys also show that most financial managers prefer the 
DCF method over any other: Bruner, Eades, Harris, and Higgins 
show that 89% of the North American companies use the DCF as 
their primary firm valuation tool, and 7% use it as a secondary tool.19  
Graham and Harvey20 surveyed 392 Chief Financial Officers on the 
 17. See 2 THE WORLD BANK GROUP, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: GUIDELINES 41-42 (1992) [hereinafter 
WORLD BANK GUIDELINES]. The World Bank has stated that: 
5. [i]n the absence of a determination agreed by, or based on the agreement of, the 
parties, the fair market value will be acceptable if determined by the State according to 
reasonable criteria related to the market value of the investment, i.e., in an amount that 
a willing buyer would normally pay to a willing seller after taking into account the 
nature of the investment, the circumstances in which it would operate in the future and 
its specific characteristics, including the period in which it has been in existence, the 
proportion of tangible assets in the total investment and other relevant factors pertinent 
to the specific circumstances of each case. 
6. Without implying the exclusive validity of a single standard for the fairness by 
which compensation is to be determined and as an illustration of the reasonable 
determination by a State of the market value of the investment under Section 5 above, 
such determination will be deemed reasonable if conducted as follows: (i) for a going 
concern with a proven record of profitability, on the basis of the discounted cash flow 
value; . . . . 
Id. 
 18. See Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112, 201-02 
(1987) (clarifying that Respondents did not object to use of the method, but its 
application); AMCO Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/8, 
¶¶ 105-107 (Oct. 17, 1990) (instituting the DCF method because it is flexible and 
allows application of judgmental elements); Enron Corp., Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 385-89 (adopting DCF to value companies, over Respondent’s 
objections); Sempra Energy Int’l, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 416 
(discussing asset base, discount rate, tariff increases and consumption effect while 
using the DCF model proposed); CMS Gas Transmission, 44 I.L.M. 1205, ¶ 416 
(stating that “[t]his leaves the Tribunal with the DCF method and it has no 
hesitation in endorsing it as the one which is the most appropriate in this case . . . 
DCF techniques have been universally adopted, including by numerous arbitral 
tribunals, as an appropriate method for valuing business assets . . . .”). 
 19. See Robert Bruner et al., Best Practices in Estimating the Cost of Capital: 
Survey and Synthesis, 8 J. FIN. PRAC. & EDUC. 13, 17 (1998) (publishing various 
data, including that 100% of financial advisers rely on DCF at least in part). 
 20. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of 
Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187 (2001) 
(finding that large firms use present value techniques while small firms use the 
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practices used to evaluate real asset investments and found that the 
two most popular techniques were the DCF and the Internal Rate of 
Return (“IRR”) approaches.21  About three out of four firms in the 
survey used both methods. Observe that both methods, DCF and 
IRR, are forward looking methods. As Reilly and Brown say, the 
epitome of value is the present value of expected cash flows. 22
C. USE OF DCF AND PROVEN RECORDS OF  
PROFITABILITY IN OIL AND GAS 
Often times we see that DCF is best recommended when 
companies are “a going concern with a proven record of 
profitability.”23  A going concern with records of profits is simply 
thought to set a precedent indicating the ability of the company to 
continue such performance in the future, and thus implicitly 
exhibiting a lower degree of uncertainty in estimating damages. 
However, in the oil and gas sector, neither being a startup company 
(as opposed to a going concern) nor lacking a historic record of 
profitability are serious impediments for using the DCF method in 
estimating damages. Oil and gas companies derive their primary 
value on the existence of reserves, and much less so on the ability to 
develop and extract such reserves and later sell them to the market. 
Indeed, the usefulness of the DCF method must be judged on a 
case-by-case basis, an exercise that must be able to identify if there 
are any company-specific constraints and geological or geographic 
difficulties. It must also take into account the degree of field 
development, crude oil characteristics, the quality of reserves, and 
the expectations of future crude oil prices. Given that the 
marketplace for crude oil is that of a tradable commodity, and given 
payback criterion). 
 21. See id. at 196 (finding that most large firms use some kind of discounted 
cash flow analysis). The IRR method is nothing but a variant of the DCF method, 
which is used more to estimate expected returns on a project, rather than to 
perform a valuation exercise—IRR computes the discount rate that makes the net 
present value of future cash flows of a project equal to zero. 
 22. FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS & 
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 378 (Southwestern/Thomson-Learning 7th ed. 2003) 
(specifying measures of cash flow as dividends, operating free cash flow, and free 
cash flow to equity). 
 23. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 42. 
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that oil companies derive their primary value from discovered 
certified reserves, the DCF cannot be ruled out simply because the 
company is a startup, or because the company has not yet established 
historic records of profitability. A case-by-case analysis is called for. 
D. DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY AND CRUDE OIL PRICE 
VOLATILITY 
Applying the DCF method in oil and gas cases raises the question 
of uncertainty and high volatility of future crude oil prices. Indeed, 
this uncertainty factor has frequently been confused with an alleged 
speculative nature of making future cash flow projections.24  
Projecting future cash flows, however, is not a speculative event, and 
certainly should not be compared to the obscure 16th century 
prophecies of Nostradamus, as Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern once 
portrayed.25  Projecting future cash flows, on the contrary, involves 
careful judgment of parameters and economic variables into the 
future, which requires reasonable assumptions. 
This judgment, of course, involves making decisions of future 
values that are uncertain. However, the DCF technique addresses 
uncertainty in at least three different ways. First, uncertainty and 
risks that are specific to the project can be built within the cash flows 
projections themselves, by using scenarios that are more likely and 
more reasonable. Take for example the uncertainty about future 
crude oil prices given the increased volatility of the last six years. 
 As Figure II illustrates, by 2006 there were already multiple 
projections for expected crude oil prices from 2007 onwards. 
Expectations as of 2007, or as of 2008 or 2009, would similarly 
 24. See, e.g., CME v. Czech Republic, Separate Opinion of Ian Brownlie, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration, ¶ 68 (Mar. 13, 2003), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME2003-SeparateOpinion_000.pdf (repeating 
the concerns expressed by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal as to the speculative nature 
of long-term cash flow projections); see also LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, ¶¶ 59, 89-90 (July 25, 2007) (rejecting using 
the DCF method, insisting on the speculative nature of future of projections, in a 
quite isolated opinion within the Argentine cases); Enron Corp. v. Argentina, 
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 385-89 (May 22, 2007), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf (highlighting the uncertainties 
resulting from the assumptions of the approach, but nevertheless adopting DCF). 
 25. See Thomas W. Wälde, Remedies and Compensation in International 
Investment Law, TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT. 51 (2005). 
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show forecasts with all sort of tendencies, also going in opposite 
directions. Valuation exercises in such volatile environments, 
therefore, require a reasonable judgment, by using all information 
available, possibly discarding projections that are considered extreme 
or outliers to the sample, and adopting a path that is consistent with 
the majority of forecasts. 
FIGURE II: CRUDE OIL PRICE PROJECTION EXAMPLE  


































EIA Reference Case (2/1/07) EIA High Price Case (2/1/07) EIA Low Price Case (2/1/07)
AJM (6/30/07) Consensus Forecasts (10/8/07) Deutsche Bank (7/16/2007)
Global Insight - Market Remanaged (04/01/07) Sproule (6/30/07) Global Insight - Market Remanaged (12/17/07)
Global Insight - Demand Constrained (12/17/07) Global Insight - Supply Constrained (12/17/07) Historical WTI Spot Price





 26.  Forecast date (or Nymex trading date) in parentheses. All data excluding 
that from the EIA were received in current dollars. Data from the 2007 EIA 
Annual Energy Outlook forecasts were received in 2005 dollars and converted to 
current dollars using the EIA inflation assumptions. See ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL CUSHING, OK WTI SPOT PRICE FOB, available at 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtca.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
Forecasted data based on AJM Petroleum Consultants Price Forecast as of June 30, 
2007; Consensus Forecasts ‘Global Outlook’ released on October 8, 2007; 
Deutsche Bank analyst report released on July 16, 2007; EIA 2007 ‘Annual Energy 
Outlook’ released in February 2007; Global Insight Price Forecasts as of April and 
December 2007; Nymex WTI Futures Prices as of December 31, 2006, May 31, 
2007 and July 13, 2007; Sproule Associates Price Forecasts as of June 30, 2007.
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Second, general risks such as investing in equity as opposed to 
safer government bonds, political risk, business cycle fluctuations, 
and macroeconomic events are captured through the use of a 
discount rate. Panels in oil and gas cases have taken into account 
these uncertainties and general risks when using discount rates. For 
example, as pointed out by Professor Marboe: 
The Tribunal in Phillips Petroleum followed this method of 
valuation—put forward by the Claimant’s expert—very 
clearly and transparently. The applied discount rate of 4.5 per 
cent was explained by the reference to average real rates of 
return to investors in U.S. non-financial corporations, which 
at the time of expropriation were 6 per cent. As it was 
generally held that investments in oil enterprises were less 
risky than average investments in the market, the discount 
rate was reduced.27
Finally, when small variations to critical assumed parameters 
produce large effects on future cash flows, the damage expert must 
provide the panel what is known as a “sensitivity analysis,” which 
would inform the panel of how damages change under lower/higher 
values of the parameters whose small variation can imply significant 
changes in quantum.28
E. A WARNING ON THE APV METHOD 
APV is a firm valuation method that also uses discounted cash 
flows, except that, unlike the traditional DCF approach, it 
incorporates the tax benefits of sourcing debt through the cash flows 
instead of through the discount rate, as computed under the 
traditional DCF analysis.29  It is therefore thought that the APV 
 27. See Phillips Petroleum v. Iran, Statement by Judge Khalilian, 21 Iran–U.S. 
Claims Tribunal Reports (1989) 194, 229, cited by Marboe, I.2006 Compensation 
and Damages in International Law: The Limits of Fair Market Value, Journal of 
World Investment and Trade, Vol 7. n° 5, p. 740. 
 28. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation 
Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 457, 499-500 (1996) 
(analyzing the potential estimation errors through sensitivity analysis preparation 
of cash flow projections and suggesting the preparation of three cash flow 
analyses: expected, pessimistic, and optimistic). 
 29. See Timothy A. Luehrman, Using APV: A Better Tool for Valuing 
Operations, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1997, at 151 (explaining that the APV 
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method can have some advantages over DCF when companies have 
complex leverage structures, as well as complex income tax 
arrangements, both features that might be present in oil and gas 
cases.30
Professor Pablo Fernandez of IESE Business School shows that 
when leverage and associated risk of cash flows and cost of 
bankruptcy are properly accounted for, the APV and the DCF 
approach (which uses the weighted average cost of capital 
(“WACC”) to account for the tax benefits of debt) are equivalent.31
We show that the three valuation methods (APV, WACC and 
Flows to Equity) always yield the same result. The paper also 
shows the relationships among cost of equity, cost of 
unlevered equity, cost of debt and weighted average cost of 
capital. We show the equivalence of the three approaches to 
firm valuation for perpetuities, then for growing companies 
(at a constant rate g) and, finally, for any company.32
However, Professor Damodaran provides some words of caution 
about the APV method, especially in cases of firms with high debt 
ratios, given how difficult it might be to value the financial distress 
component: 
There are many who believe that adjusted present value is a 
more flexible way of approaching valuation than traditional 
discounted cash flow models. This may be true in a generic 
sense, but APV valuation in practice has significant flaws. 
The first and most important is that most practitioners who 
use the adjusted present value model ignore expected 
bankruptcy costs. Adding the tax benefits to unlevered firm 
value to get to the levered firm value makes debt seem like an 
calculates the firm value as the sum of the unlevered firm value plus the value of 
net tax benefits due to debt financing—measured as the present value of the yearly 
tax shield (the taxes that the company avoids paying due to leverage), less an 
amount representative of the cost of financial distress). 
 30. See id. at 154 (identifying biases in the analysis if stocks and bonds are 
taxed differently, and realizing that APV is still a DCF methodology). 
 31. See Pablo Fernandez, Equivalence of the APV, WACC and Flows to 
Equity Approaches to Firm Valuation 1 (Aug. 30, 1997) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5737 (also 
showing that the net present value of a tax shield due to interest payments must be 
calculated with a particular APV formula). 
 32. Id. 
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unmixed blessing. Firm value will be overstated, especially at 
very high debt ratios, where the cost of bankruptcy is clearly 
not zero and, in some instances, the cost of bankruptcy is 
higher than the tax benefit of debt.33
Therefore, despite its apparent innovations, the APV method 
might yet not be ready to be a substitute to the DCF, which is still 
considered the gold standard in income-approach valuation methods. 
IV. VALUATION DATES AND USE OF HINDSIGHT 
INFORMATION 
The selection of valuation dates, and to what extent the damage 
expert should use the benefits of hindsight information in performing 
a valuation is of considerable importance in oil and gas cases, given 
the volatility of crude oil prices. Unlike general damage valuation 
theory and practice, where there is no pre-established practice as to 
the setting of a valuation date or as to whether to rely on the use of 
hindsight information, in expropriation matters there is certain 
tension regarding the choice of valuation date and the use of 
hindsight information. This tension arises because, on the one hand, 
there is the concept that the valuation of an expropriation matter is 
supposed to be conducted at the moment “immediately before the 
time at which the taking occurred or the decision to take the asset 
became publicly known,”34 whereas, on the other hand, to fully 
compensate the damaged party à la Chorzów,35 the valuation has to 
restore the financial position that the damaged party would have had 
today in the absence of the harm, and thus a valuation date as close 
as possible to the date of award might be of order.36 Similar logic 
 33. Aswath Damodaran, The Adjusted Present Value Approach, 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/valquestions/apv.htm; see 
Thierry Senechal, Dealing with Uncertainty: Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Versus 
Adjusted Present Value (APV), TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT.,  June 2007, at 1 
(comparing the DCF and APV methods further). 
 34. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 41. 
 35. See Factory at Chorzów,  (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 47 
(Sept. 13) (containing the most cited compensation principle that “. . . reparation 
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed.”).
 36. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16  
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applies to damaging actions other than expropriation, such as unfair 
and inequitable treatment, or discrimination. 
Using valuation date at the time of expropriation raises at least two 
important considerations: First, if the valuation exercise is done 
using only expectations at the time of expropriation, without looking 
at hindsight, there is a risk that the compensation might not restore 
the investor with the financial position it would have had in the 
absence of the taking. This is so because post-expropriation events 
(for instance higher crude oil prices) might imply a business that is, 
at the time of the award, more valuable than at the time of 
expropriation. Second, when expropriation is the result of 
consequential measures, the use of hindsight information is highly 
recommended and the selection of a valuation date at a date closer to 
the date of the award would provide a more accurate estimate of 
damages.37
Indeed, in Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, the ICSID Tribunal uses 
hindsight information and emphasized that, in line with the Chorzów 
Factory principles, information that became known after the date of 
the wrongful act had to be taken into account: 
If the purpose of compensation is to put Amco in the position 
it would have been in had it received the benefits of the 
Profit-Sharing Agreement, then there is no reason of logic 
that requires that to be done by reference only to data that 
would have been known to a prudent businessman in 1980.38
¶¶ 484-94 (Oct. 2, 2006) (emphasizing the widespread use of the Chorzów 
principles in international arbitration). 
 37. See Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Chorzów’s Standard 
Rejuvenated: Assessing Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 25 J. INT'L 
ARB. 103, 104 (2008) (explaining that hindsight information not only allows courts 
to calculate the residual value of the investment after the measures, but also to 
capture any elevated value due to improved business conditions which investors 
were deprived of due to the state measures); Irmgard Marboe, Compensation and 
Damages in International Law: The Limits of “Fair Market Value”, 7 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 723, 752 (2006) (noting that the European Court of Human 
Rights has repeatedly cited the Chorzów Factory principles of compensation and in 
doing so, awarded amounts that took into account the increase in value of 
unlawfully expropriated property between the time of the taking and the date of the 
award). 
 38. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 569, 614 (May 31, 
1990) (adding that “[t]he only subsequent known factors relevant to value which 
  
2009] KEY DAMAGE COMPENSATION ISSUES 557 
 
The Amco panel also stated that: 
But as to valuation techniques, for 1980-1989 the Tribunal 
will not use the perspective of what the reasonable 
businessman in 1980 could foresee, because for this period it 
can use known data for relevant factors, including the year-
by-year inflation rate, as provided to the Tribunal by the 
World Bank, from Laporangan Minggu, Bank Indonesia, as 
well as actual exchange and taxation rates.39
Most recently, in various arbitration awards involving energy 
disputes in Argentina (CMS v. Argentina, Sempra v. Argentina, and 
Enron v. Argentina) the Tribunals actually relied on valuation 
exercises that used hindsight information to determine damages.40
The Chorzòw Factory compensation standard has a powerful 
economic logic when dealing with cases in which the value of the 
assets exhibits volatile changes, such as in the oil and gas industry. 
The underlying logic forces the party that inflicted damages to bear 
the ex-post risks associated with the damaged or taken asset, up to 
the time of the award. In the case the value of the asset increases in 
that period, the windfall would belong to the claimant by valuating 
the compensation at the date of the award using hindsight 
information, whereas if the asset would have lost value in the 
absence of the damaging measures, the damaging party would absorb
are not to be relied on are those attributable to the illegality itself.”). 
 39. See id. at 616-17 (adding that in order to maintain real value, the known 
yearly inflation rate would be added to the base value, but that the DCF standard 
would apply after 1990, when no fixed inflation rates information was available). 
 40. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, 44 I.L.M. 1205, ¶¶ 418-472 (2005) (suggesting that although it is 
possible to estimate a rational value by analogy, the accurateness will not be 
verified until time has passed); Enron Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 346-452 (May 22, 2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/ 
documents/Enron-Award.pdf (weighing the DCF approach, against the book value 
and unjust enrichment approach regarding damages); Sempra Energy Int’l v. 
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 398-486 (Sept. 28, 2007), 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases 
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694_En&caseId=C8 (evaluating two 
different methodologies for arriving at an appropriate remedy, whether a party 
created or destroyed value, compared with the value of the firms, minus the 
pesification scenario, plus the historical damages). 
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the loss in value by valuating compensation at the date of the 
taking.41
Chorzów Factory’s compensation principle puts States on notice 
that treaty violations will not grant them economic windfalls, in 
particular if States act opportunistically at times when crude oil 
prices soar.42
In line with common practice in general damage valuation cases,43 
using hindsight information captures any elevated value due to 
improved business conditions which claimants were deprived of due 
to the measures by the party inflicting damages. In addition, it 
provides incentives for parties not to act opportunistically when 
business conditions are expected to improve, thus acting as a 
deterrent. Finally, its use provides accurate and adequate damage 
estimates, given that with the benefit of hindsight the damage expert 
can compute actual damages as time passes by. The latter is critical 
information that panels usually welcome and are not likely to 
ignore.44
 41. See Factory at Chorzów (Ger. V. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 50-
51 (Sept. 13) (stating that “the value of the undertaking at the moment of 
dispossession doesn’t necessarily indicate the criterion for the fixing of 
compensation,” and that the Court must contemplate the financial results which 
would “probably have been given by the undertaking thus constituted” up to the 
date of the present judgment, and the value at the date of the present judgment of 
the same undertaking if that undertaking had remained in the hands of the German 
entities). 
 42. See id. at 45-46 (explaining that Poland could not rely on the treaty of 
Versailles to annul a sale because it suited Poland’s needs). Notice that in a volatile 
price environment, such as oil and gas, this principle implies that damages will 
inevitably vary depending on the timing at which the case is decided.
 43. See Michael K. Dunbar & Michael Joseph Wagner, Differences Between 
Economic Damage Analysis and Business Valuation, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
BUSINESS VALUATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANALYSIS 328, 331 (Robert 
F. Reilly & Robert P. Schweihs eds., 2004) (noting that the use of hindsight 
information in computing damages is generally accepted in U.S. courts, which is 
usually referred to as of using the “book of wisdom”); see also SHANNON P. 
PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE 
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 869 (4th ed. McGraw-
Hill 2000) (referring to this mode of calculating damages as “the Before-and-After 
Method”). 
 44. But see INA Corp. v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 380 (1985) 
(stating that “[f]air market value may be stated as the amount which a willing 
buyer would have paid a willing seller . . . disregarding any diminution of value 
due to the nationalization itself . . . and excluding consideration of events thereafter 
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The exclusion of hindsight information is contrary to Chorzów 
Factory’s compensation standard because between the time of the 
enactment of the measures and the resolution of the case, exogenous 
events such as an increase in the price of crude oil may happen. 
These occurrences would change the value of the affected assets in 
the absence of the damaging actions. Such exogenous events could 
relate to changes in demand, interest rates, input, or output prices. 
Since States are tempted to act opportunistically precisely when 
business conditions are expected to improve or have already 
improved, the use of valuation dates at the time of award and the use 
of hindsight information is an important element to prevent 
opportunistic takings. We have witnessed in the last years, before the 
2008 downturn on the oil price, several oil rich countries imposing 
extra taxes or royalties on oil producing companies or forcing them 
to renegotiate their contracts so as to produce an increase in 
government’s overall take.45
that might have increased or decreased the value of the shares;” which has been 
interpreted by some authors as a recommendation to exclude hindsight 
information). This view implies that, if the firm suffered an increase in value after 
the nationalization events, the investor was not fully compensated according to the 
Chorzów Factory principle. Id. 
 45. Some examples of this behavior might be in order. In May 2006, 
VENEZUELA introduced an extraction tax that increased the royalty rate from 16% 
to 33% of the value of production at the wellhead. Later, in February 2007, 
Venezuela mandated that the national oil company (PdVSA) assume full 
operational control over the Orinoco Belt and other oil projects. See Official 
Gazette No. 38.443, May 24, 2006, “Ley de Reforma Parcial del Decreto 1.510 
con Fuerza de Ley Orgánica de Hidrocarburos.” See also, Official Gazette No. 
38.632, February 26, 2007, “Decree No. 5.200.”  In ECUADOR, the Government 
issued Law 2006-42 in April 2006 introducing a 50% state participation over all 
revenues obtained due to oil prices increase since the time of contract not 
explained by CPI. This government take was further raised to 99% in October 
2007 by Decree 662. See Law 2006-42 dated on April 25, 2006 and Decree 662 of 
October 18, 2007. ARGENTINA introduced export taxes for crude oil in March 2002 
at a nominal rate of 20%. The tax was increased on May 11, 2004 to a nominal rate 
of 25%. On August 4, 2004, the Government implemented a further increase in 
export taxes on crude oil. Depending on the international price of crude oil, the 
nominal rates of export taxes ranged from 25% to 45% up to the end of 2007. 
Finally, in November 2007, the Government raised crude oil export rates, which 
resulted in imposing a maximum price of $ 42 per barrel. See Decree 310/2002, 
Ministry of Economics Resolution 532/2004 and Ministry of Economy and 
Production Resolution 394/2007. In KAZAKHSTAN, see Hotten, supra note 12 
(reporting on the correlation between the rise of crude oil prices and Kazakhstan’s 
review of oil revenue agreements). 
  
560 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:539 
We advocate the use of ex-post information in this type of damage 
analysis so as to allow panels to measure the extent of economic 
windfalls, if any, taken by States or damaging parties that might have 
acted opportunistically and thus to include such windfall, if 
appropriate, in claimant’s compensation. 
A. EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HINDSIGHT INFORMATION 
This Section focuses on a numerical example that shows how the 
decision whether or not to use hindsight information affects the level 
of compensation in cases involving assets with significant price 
fluctuations. In turn, the example shows how the lack of use of 
hindsight information may leave opportunistic behavior that changes 
the original terms of the business arrangement undeterred. 
 Let us consider as an hypothetical example (see Figure III), a 
crude oil company that has signed a thirty-year agreement by which 
it could sell the crude oil it extracted at free market prices with no 
interference from oil-specific taxes, and subject to certain investment 
obligations. This hypothetical contract is signed in the mid-nineties, 
when the price of WTI was slightly below $20 per barrel. Then, in 
2004, just when the WTI soars to $40 per barrel, the Government 
imposes an illegal 50% tax on crude oil. 
FIGURE III: HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF THE  






2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
WTI Price ($ per barrel) 20 40 50 60 100 140 50 
Tax 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Claimants ($ per barrel) 20 20 25 30 50 70 25 
Government ($ per barrel) 0 20 25 30 50 70 25 
In 2006, the WTI price jumps to around $60 per barrel. A year 
later, the WTI price further increases to $100 per barrel, and during 
2008, it peaks at $140 per barrel to drop suddenly to $50 per barrel in 
early 2009. See the hypothetical evolution of prices in Figure III. The 
questions presented by these facts include what price should we use 
to determine the compensation in order to restore the position that 
claimant would have today in the absence of the tax?  At what date 
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should we valuate damages?  Should we use hindsight information, 
and if so, how? 
Some creative defense positions would argue that the pre-tax value 
to claimant should be assessed using pre-tax information just prior to 
the measure, whereas the post-tax value should use post-tax 
information immediately after the measure. This “vanilla” before vs 
after damage valuation approach often leads to absurd results. Using 
our example, this approach would compute the pre-tax value using 
the WTI just prior to the tax, which is $20 per barrel, so that before 
the tax claimant would have a value of $20 per each barrel sold. In 
the “immediately-after-tax” situation, it also receives $20 per barrel 
sold, as at a price of $40 per barrel, the Government keeps half of 
that amount in taxes, and the other half ($20 per barrel) is kept by 
claimant. Therefore, this (invalid) approach would arrive to the 
absurd result that compensation ought to be zero. 
An alternative approach attempts also to asses damages at the date 
of the taking, in 2004, neglecting the use of hindsight information 
altogether, but using a “but-for vs actual” approach, as opposed to a 
“before vs after” analysis. This approach would ignore any increase 
in WTI prices beyond 2004 and will result in a damage of $20 per 
barrel plus prejudgment interest, as in the but-for situation a 50% tax, 
evaluated when the price of crude oil is at $40 per barrel in 2004, has 
produced the effect of reducing the value to claimant in $20 per 
barrel as of that time. 
However, notice that a compensation that ignores how reality has 
evolved after the introduction of the tax would not make claimant 
whole in the sense of Chorzów principles. Clearly, a compensation at 
$20 per barrel as of 2004 plus interest would not restore what 
claimant would have had as of today (2009), for example, in the 
absence of the tax, given WTI prices of $50 per barrel. If the investor 
were to sell its assets today, it would be receiving a value 
commensurate with a net (after-tax) price of $25 barrel plus a $20 
per barrel compensation value plus interest. This amount, at roughly 
$45 per barrel plus interest would be lower than the value it would 
receive in the absence of the tax, as of today, if claimant had sold its
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assets at a price of $50 per barrel. Thus, the investor would have not 
been fully compensated.46
The government, however, would have benefited from this award, 
as it is mandated to compensate only at $20 per barrel plus interest 
and yet since 2004 it collected taxes at a higher than $20 per barrel 
for all years but 2004 (see Figure III). Clearly, ignoring hindsight 
does not seem to do justice in this case. 
In addition, neglecting hindsight also neglects the fact that just one 
year earlier to the date of the award (i.e., in 2008), the investor could 
have sold its assets when the WTI price was $140 per barrel. How do 
we value such opportunity lost? Using hindsight information 
therefore is needed for two reasons, one to assess the actual position 
that claimant would have been today in the absence of the damaging 
measure and second, to more accurately evaluate actual damages as 
evolved in reality, since the date of the taking to the date of award. In 
volatile environments such as oil and gas, a compensation based on a 
fair market valuation at the most recent date (plus actual losses since 
the date of introduction of the tax) would leave the investor whole 
under the Chorzów Factory principle of restoration. 
V. PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATES 
When a valuation date is chosen at a date that is far apart in time 
from the date of the award, the selection of the pre-judgment plays a 
central role in the amount of compensation. A wrong interest rate 
could result in a monetary award that does not fully restore the 
position of the damaged party in the absence of the measures. 
Consider, for instance, the oil and gas example discussed above. In 
2004 the tax took away half of the revenues of the investor when the 
price of crude oil was $40 per barrel. Suppose for simplicity that 
production was ten million barrels a year so that revenues were $400 
million and that, due to the new tax, 50% of that amount ($200 
million) was taken by the government. Assume there is a similar 
production level in 2005. Given that prices went up to $50 per barrel 
in that year, the amount taken by the tax is now $250 million ($50 
 46. Similar conclusion would be reached had we compare the proposed 
compensation to the price the claimant could have sold for in prior years, such as 
2008, 2007 or 2006, for instance.
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per barrel times 100 million barrels times 50% tax rate). Suppose, 
now, that by 2006 there is no longer a tax in force, and that claimant 
submits a request for arbitration in that year. By 2008, a panel has 
found that the government is liable and has to reach a decision on 
damages. 
The nominal amount of the taking is clearly $450 million ($200 
million taken in 2004, $250 million in 2005).47  If the valuation date 
is set as of 2004, a damage expert would discount the $250 million 
lost in 2005 at a discount rate equal to the cost of capital of the 
industry, say at 10%. Then, damages as of 2004 would be $427.27 
million ($200 million plus $250 million discounted at 10%, for one 
year). 
The award, however, is payable in currency as of 2008. The panel, 
then, could well rule that damages as of 2004 are $427.27 million 
and that pre-judgment interest must be computed at a certain rate. Let 
us assume the Panel rules that interest rate must be set at an ad-hoc 
compounded rate of 5%. Claimant would then receive an award 
worth $519.35 million ($427.27 million plus compounded interest at 
5% per year for four years) in 2008. Is claimant fully compensated?  
Let us examine what the theory and practice says about the level of 
pre-judgment interest rate for these cases. 
Unfortunately, there is no established academic consensus as to 
the selection of the pre-judgment interest rate and this is true not only 
for international arbitration but also for U.S. litigation cases. This 
lack of consensus is predictably reflected in tribunals’ decisions, 
which have granted pre-judgment interest rates using a variety of 
different criteria, or even granted no interest at all.48
 47. For the sake of simplicity, I am ignoring here applicable income taxes as 
well as changes in costs that might be related to revenues. 
 48. Compare Enron Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,  
¶ 452 (May 22, 2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-
Award.pdf (“once the amount of damage and compensation has been determined at 
a given date it is more appropriate that such amount should bear interest as from 
such date. Moreover, any risk of double jeopardy is thereby avoided”); with Corfu 
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 10 (Dec. 15) (omitting interest from the 
amount of compensation, and setting  a fixed amount due from Albania to the 
United Kingdom). 
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A. INTEREST BASED ON THE BORROWING  
RATE OF RESPONDENT 
Professors Patell, Weil, and Wolfson, on the other hand, have 
proposed using the respondent’s unsecured borrowing rate under the 
so-called coerced loan theory,49 an idea that is advocated by Knoll 
and others in the international arbitration arena.50
This coerced loan view works as follows. Suppose there is a 
finding that the respondent caused $10 million in damages at an 
earlier date (i.e., the valuation date). The damaged party should have 
had an additional $10 million during the time since the valuation 
date. However, respondent used the deprived $10 million, so the 
situation can be made tantamount to an involuntary loan. Thus, if this 
can be viewed as a loan, then the pre-judgment interest rate is the 
unsecured borrowing rate that respondent would pay to borrow the 
$10 million amount. However, note that this approach, by focusing 
the attention on respondent’s cost of borrowing rather than on the 
damaged party’s opportunity cost for its deprived $10 million, does 
not necessarily result in full compensation, as it might fail to restore 
the damaged party to the appropriate position. The damaged party 
would have rather used the $10 million in its own business and earn 
a return on it, rather than having been forced to loan it to the 
damaging party, for which the injured party has to bear collection 
risks that it did not intend to assume. In fact, to the extent that 
respondent’s cost of borrowing is lower than the damaged party’s
 49. James M. Patell, Roman L. Weil & Mark A. Wolfson, Accumulating 
Damages in Litigation: The Roles of Uncertainty and Interest Rates, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 341, 362 (1982) (instructing that the rate should reflect both the extent to 
which the plaintiff was forced to alter his consumption and investment plan and the 
possibility that the plaintiff bore risks which differed from those inherent in his 
undamaged position). 
 50. See Jeffrey M. Colón & Michael S. Knoll, Prejudgment Interest in 
International Arbitration, 4 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 1, 10-11 (2007) 
(noting that this method acts as though the damage caused by the respondent is 
actually a forced borrowing); see also Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment 
Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 352-54 (1996) (explaining the proper method as 
discounting “future damages to the date of injury using a discount rate appropriate 
for the project and then [calculating] prejudgment interest on that award using the 
defendant's cost of unsecured borrowing.”). 
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return on its business, the compensation is not sufficient to repair the 
harm done by the taking.51
B. RISK-FREE INTEREST RATES 
Another view, offered by economists like Professor Fisher, is that 
the prejudgment interest rate should be based on a risk-free rate, 
typically the rate on short-term government securities (such as U.S. 
Treasury bills).52  This approach seems appropriate as long as the 
valuation is conducted at the time of expropriation and the deprived 
assets or cash flows are no longer subject to operating risks. If the 
damaged company is subject to operating risks or the legal theory of 
the claim is such that a current valuation date is called for, however, 
there are merits for a risk-adjusted rate.53  This was clearly stated in a 
recent United States Federal Court decision in CCA Associates v. 
United States,54 in which the respondent (the U.S. government) was 
arguing for a risk-free interest rate to bring cash flows forward to the 
date of the awards. However, the court rejected this idea as it found 
that, “[t]he government’s approach, however, does not adequately 
adjust the value of [CCA’s lost] cash flow stream to account for 
risk.”55
 51. The opposite will be true if the respondent’s cost of borrowing were to be 
higher than what claimant would have obtained as a return from its own business. 
 52. See Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook and 
the Theory of Damages, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 145, 146-48 (1990) (noting 
that compensating the plaintiff at the rate it reasonably expected to earn on the 
destroyed asset is flawed because the plaintiff would be entitled to interest 
compensating it for “the time value of money . . . [but not] also entitled to 
compensation for the risks it did not bear.”). 
 53. See Roy J. Epstein, Prejudgment Interest Rate in Patent Cases Don’t 
Compound an Error, 24 No. 2 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. (ABA Section of 
Intellectual Property Law, Chicago, Ill.), Winter, 2006, at 1, 9-10 (discussing the 
use of risk-adjusted pre-judgment interest rates other than the coerced loan theory). 
 54. 75 Fed. Cl. 170, 204 (2007), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 284 Fed. 
Appx. 810 (arguing that “a single, risk-free interest rate should be used to bring 
cash flows forward, not only to the date the taking ended or to the date the 
judgment is entered, but to the date the judgment is paid.”). 
 55. Id. 
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C. INTEREST BASED ON THE OPPORTUNITY COST  
OF THE LOST INVESTMENT 
To overcome the risk of under compensation in the use of risk-free 
interest rates, some have advocated the use of the company’s lost 
return, so as to reflect the opportunity cost of the deprived cash flows 
or moneys to the damaged party.56  The main logic here is that in the 
absence of the damaging actions, the damaged party would have had 
additional money in the past that it in fact did not have. The damaged 
party would have used that additional money in its business, and 
would have earned a prudent57 return on those funds, which could be 
measured by some historic measure of the company’s performance, 
or more conservatively, by its average cost of capital or WACC. 
In principle, to fully repair the damage, the selection of the proper 
pre-judgment interest rate should be linked to the risk that the 
damaged party was exposed to during the time of valuation and the 
time of the award, in line with the opportunity cost of the deprived 
money (i.e. cash flows). The interest rate would thus need to be 
related to the investment alternatives of the damaged party. 
According to the subjective valuation approach, the 
determination of the rate of interest, its duration and the 
question of compounding should be based on the concrete 
financial situation of the injured person. If, for example, a 
loan was taken in order to bridge the period without the 
money, it is evident that the interest actually paid becomes 
the measure of damages. If the taking of a loan was not 
necessary because the injured person had enough money at 
 56. See John C. Keir & Robin C. Keir, Opportunity Cost: A Measure of 
Prejudgment Interest, 39 BUS. LAW. 129, 147 (1983) (noting that one way the 
opportunity cost of not having been paid damages will be reflected in the cost to 
the firm of borrowing money). 
 57. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
122 F. Supp. 2d 444, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 302 F.3d 18 
(2d Cir. 2002) (finding that, in relation to an alleged deficiency in assets in a 
retirement trust, in the absence of damages, the trust would have reinvested the lost 
funds in the same fashion as the rest of its portfolio and thus it used the trust’s 
actual overall rate of return as the equivalent of the pre-judgment interest rate). A 
prudent investor would have invested the funds to produce a reasonable return 
while maintaining safety of principal. A prudent investor should earn, on average, 
a return equal to its cost of capital. The investor, of course, could have factually 
earned a return on the damaged company that is higher or lower than the cost of 
capital, or WACC. 
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his or her disposal, one has to consider that he or she could 
have used or invested the money otherwise. It is therefore 
decisive to identify the available investment alternatives of 
the injured investor in order to achieve full reparation.58
Indeed, in the recent international arbitration decision of Vivendi v. 
Argentina, the Tribunal recognized a pre-judgment interest rate that 
conceptually represented a “reasonable proxy for the return 
Claimants could otherwise have earned on the amounts invested and 
lost in the Tucumán concession.”59  Claimants in this case had asked 
for a 9.7% interest rate, equal to the cost of capital at which cash 
flows were discounted in their DCF valuation analysis.60  The 
Tribunal, however, possibly looking at the fact that Vivendi’s Aguas 
del Tucumán was not such a great business to be in, granted only a 
6% interest rate, arguing, “[t]he Tribunal is not persuaded that 
claimants would have earned 9.7%.”61  In doing so, this Tribunal 
realized that the pre-judgment interest rate at which Vivendi’s 
damages should be brought forward from a valuation date that is ten 
years apart from the date of the award is not a risk-free interest rate, 
but rather, an interest rate that must reflect the opportunity cost of the 
lost invested amounts.62
One criticism counseling against this approach is that awarding the 
damaged party an interest rate equal to its cost of capital will create a 
moral hazard problem, as there could be an incentive for the 
damaged party to delay the arbitration so as to earn, safely, a risk-
adjusted return.63  However, although this argument has some 
 58. See Marboe, supra note 37, at 754 (footnote omitted) (reporting that “the 
United States-Iran claims Tribunal developed this concept in Sylvana Technical 
Systems, holding that interest should be calculated on the basis of the investment 
alternatives of the Claimant.”). Other United States-Iran cases followed the same 
line of reasoning. Id. 
 59. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3, ¶ 9.2.8  (Aug. 20, 2007). 
 60. See id. ¶ 9.2.7 (noting that the rate would correspond to the “discount rate 
applied to Claimants’ DCF analysis and the quoted rate on the Argentine Treasury 
bond.”). 
 61. See id. ¶ 9.2.7-.8 (speculating that claimants would not earn that interest on 
their respective shares of damages awarded had such sums been timely paid at the 
date of Argentina's expropriation of the concession). 
 62. Id. ¶ 9.2.8. 
 63. See Epstein, supra note 53, at 9 (adding that this could frustrate the process 
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foundation for cases in which there are outright takings and the 
damaged party is no longer operating the asset, it does not hold well 
when the damage is partial and the damaged party is (or was) 
foregoing a return on the deprived cash flows while operating the 
asset (and thus subject to its business risks). 
In most oil and gas cases where damages may arise from partial 
takings or increases in taxation by government, the issue of the 
appropriate pre-judgment interest rate then becomes critical. In our 
example above, granting $519.35 million based on an ad-hoc 5% 
pre-judgment interest rate may well result in low compensation if the 
damaged party could have used the $450 million that was taxed away 
in their own oil business. The cost for the oil company to substitute 
the $450 million that was lost was exactly equal to the cost of capital 
of sourcing funds to the damaged company, in our example 10%. 
The cost of capital is nothing but the WACC.64 Using the WACC in 
cases of partial damages would provide the oil and gas investor an 
interest compensation that, on average, is equal to the cost of 
sourcing capital in its industry, and thus, on average, this 
compensation should restore the opportunity cost of money in its 
business. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Article argues that in the oil and gas industry, given the large 
swings in crude oil prices, arbitration cases are likely to take place 
because of opportunism as parties (in particular States), may want to 
change long-term contractual arrangements to their favor when there 
are unexpected turns on crude oil prices. This is exacerbated when 
the main investments at the exploration stage are already undertaken, 
reserves are proven, and thus large investments are already sunk. The 
temptation to alter the pre-established commercial arrangements for 
of litigation and limit settlements). 
 64. Notice that given the volatility of crude oil prices, granting a pre-judgment 
rate based on the WACC will not necessarily coincide with the actual returns that 
the company could have made on the non-deprived cash flows. If by 2006 crude 
oil prices tripled as compared to 2004, then a prejudgment interest rate at the 
WACC would still fall short of restoring the situation of the investor had it not 
been taxed. On the contrary, if by 2006 crude oil prices went down significantly, 
granting the WACC could result in an award of which the investor turned out to be 
better off had it reinvested the deprived cash flows in the company. 
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exploitation of the discovered resources is higher, often resulting in 
sudden transfers of wealth among parties, and, as a consequence, in 
arbitration disputes. 
Another common source of arbitration disputes in the industry 
arises from the fact that governments typically retain ownership and 
overall management responsibilities of the natural resources, as well 
as ample regulatory powers to introduce price controls or use energy 
prices as economic tools for redistribution policies, potentially 
altering the initial commitments and investor expectations prevailing 
at the time the contractual arrangements are made. 
Several issues arise that are of predominant importance in 
estimating arbitration damage compensation in the international oil 
and gas industry. First, this Article highlighted the importance of 
selecting a damages method that appropriately accounts for 
uncertainty of the value of future revenues, either related to volatile 
crude oil prices or the extent of reserves. Among different 
alternatives, income-based approaches such as the DCF method are 
best suited to compute damages in this industry. Because oil and gas 
companies derive their primary value on the existence of reserves, 
rather than on the ability to develop and extract such reserves and 
later sell them to the market, the DCF is a suitable method even if the 
company subject to valuation lacks a record of historic profitability, 
a precondition that some panels consider a must-check before 
endorsing DCF estimates. Further, uncertainty about future cash 
flows can be assessed by making reasonable and informed judgments 
about key parameters that determine future revenues and costs (and 
thus cash flows), by using the proper risk-adjusted discount factor, 
and by undertaking sensitivity analysis to damage estimates. 
Second, the choice of valuation date and the use of hindsight 
information play a relevant role in damage assessment, in particular 
when takings are temporary. Indeed, in these cases the “time of the 
taking,” which is usually chosen as the valuation date, is the full 
period during which the damaging action diminish the value of the 
asset, not the start of that period. It is thus more appropriate that 
either the valuation date for temporary takings be designated as the 
end of the takings period or, alternatively, to use hindsight 
information to account for the ongoing nature of the damaging 
actions if the valuation date is set at the start of the period when 
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measures begin. This Article illustrated a simple oil and gas example 
that explains that hindsight information, that is, events that transpired 
during the temporary takings period (such as an increase in the price 
of crude oil) have to be taken into account in both the but-for and 
actual scenarios for compensation to be full and appropriate, and in 
line with the traditional Chorzów Factory compensation principles.  
Finally, the issue of pre-judgment interest rate is of utter 
importance. Although there is no established academic consensus as 
to the selection of the pre-judgment interest rate, it is important to 
recognize that in temporary takings, investors are still subject to the 
operating risks of the business, and that the deprived cash flows due 
to the damaging actions have an opportunity cost, which, on average, 
is equal to the cost of capital of sourcing funds to replace such flows. 
This cost of capital is best represented by the company’s WACC. In 
the recent Vivendi decision, indeed the panel reasoned within this 
same conceptual line, even so the taking had become permanent, and 
articulated that the pre-judgment interest rate ought to be based on a 
reasonable proxy for the return that the damaged party could 
otherwise have earned on the amounts invested and lost due to the 
damaging actions. Applying this logic is likely to better comply with 
the principles of full compensation, as opposed to adopting ad-hoc 
interest rates. 
 
